ABSTRACT

As was required by Ayastafenos Treaty of Peace, that was signed at the end of 1877 – 1878 Ottoman – Russian war in which Ottoman suffered from a hard defeat, Batum was left to Russia, as well as Kars and Ardahan. Ottoman State’s main goal in the Caucasus Front during the First World War was to regain those areas. However, during the course of the War nothing in the Caucasus Front went as was initially hoped for the Ottoman Empire. Besides not being able to re-conquer the aforementioned areas the Ottoman Empire has lost a considerable part of Eastern Anatolia to Russia. In spite of the defeat suffered, the events which led to the rise of the Bolsheviks in Russia -and their eventual hold of the government- has given the Ottoman Empire theopportunity to have Kars, Ardahan and Batum back to her control. During the Turkish National War of Independence, Batum became a significant area of maneuver for the new National Assembly’s (TBMM) foreign policy. The main aim of TBMM’s foreign politics was partly to re-balance the power gap between the two sides of the War of Independence. In this frame, gaining the support of a “big state” appeared as a strategic goal which was perennial to the success of the cause. Obviously, the state of the international relations of the era permitted this “big state” to be no other then the USSR. TBMM didn’t hesitate to leave Batum as a concession to USSR to strengthen the bi-lateral relations through gaining the trust of the Bolsheviks. When judged by the outcome, the consequent events strongly indicate that, this strategy has handsomely paid of and, in time, the handing over of the Batum to the USSR proves to be an act of clever real-politics, which brought strategic profundity to the Turkish foreign policy rather than a loss.